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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WITTON B. ELLERBECK, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-




RESPONDENT'S PETITION AND BRIEF ON 
REHEARING 
Comes now the petitioner, Respondent herein, and 
moves this Honorable Court for a rehearing and recon-
sideration of its opinion and judgment in the above 
entitled cause, and for grounds and as a basis for such 
motion respondent relies upon the following: 
1. The Court erred in refusing to apply the rule as 
it applies to will cases, that all reasonable presumptions 
are to be indulged in favor of the correctness of the 
findings. 
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2 
-· -- 2. The Court . erred in its decision in holding the 
document written and signed by Ben B. Ellerbeck a~ 
·conditional. 
. . 
3. -'The Co'urt erred in refusing to consider the 
_evidence. on the question of intent of the testator. 
-· 4. The Court 'erred in refusing to treat the seYeral 
parts of the will as' separate and distinct, and in con-
sidering the argument of respondent as to san1e anlount-
irig to ·a splitting of hairs. 
5. The Court erred in applying the princip~ls of 
law as laid down in the case of Walker v. Hibbard to the 
instant case ... 
6. The·opinion and judgment of the Court as ren-
dered, predicated upon the erroneous deter1nination of 
the foregoing propositions is erroneous and should be 
vacated and set aside. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court found in its pre-trial order (R ..... ) 
paragraph "6 that the will is absolute, and is not eon-
dition~I, and. in .its. Findings of Fact it found thP doeu-
1Uent"''6ffered to be ·an olographic will and the last \\'ill 
and T~st.ament .of the de:ceased; that it was (~xecutPd in 
all r~~pects a~d particulars as required by la"T' and that 
the -testator at the time of the execution of said doeutnent. 
~as 'of sound rnind and not under any rPstraint, durr~~, 
menace, fraud, undue influence or fraudulent 1nisrPpn·-
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sentations. As Conclusions of Law~ the trial -court 
ordered the document ·admitted to probate as the last 
\Yill and Testament of said deceased. The judgment of 
the trial court is amply supported.by these findings. 
In holding that the will of Ben- Ellerbeck is- 'c()n·-
ditional the Court places the same meaning and cof!struc-
tion on the wdrds used by Eller beck, namely; "in the 
event I do not survive" as have been given in some cases 
to words used by testators who are about to embark on a 
trip and say "if I should not return." Thi.s application is 
erroneous. A clear distinction can be·· mad·el as to the 
question of intent of the maker. In the one ~ase ·a par;. 
.. ~ ' - • • I .- ·:)' _,.,. :.''i ~ 
ticular time or event is named, in the other there is· no 
specific time or particular event named, th~ :lwords are 
general in their character. .;L/;1 ;'s/.\ 
The Courts have held wills to be not conditional even 
where the will is as follows: 
"If any accident should happen to me and I die from 
home," and testator died at home. Likefield v. Likefield, 
82 Ky. 589 cited in Walker v. Hibbarcl: in which the vvill 
was made on January 14, 1859 and test.ator die<} ~t ho~e 
L ' 'L, ' ' 
March 28, 1881 leaving his widow and n9 .. ~ cpVdr~n .. _The 
'\:1 '.'lllt I ,. ' ; 
evidence shows testator and his wife lived: together f<;>r 
over 30 years, he kept the paper. in con t~st in ~- StP~ll 
tin box. In the latter part of the ye~r of his de-~th,.,_.and 
in the presence of his wife, testator axamined his p~p_ers 
including the document and after reading it oyer replacecJ. 
it in the box and directed his 'vife to take care of it. 
. . .• . I 
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Testator' s- brothers and sisters, and the children of 
a deceased brother contested the writing contending it 
was a contingent will and never becan1e effectiYe, n~ he 
:died at home . 
.. -: ·. T.he court said the rule is that ~ourt ,\·ill not be 
inelined to regard, a will as conditional, if it can be 
reasonably held that the maker was sin1ply expressing 
an inducement to make it. 
' . - . . ,' 
So; ''1n case I should die on my travels," was held not 
conditional although testator returned home, it bein.fl 
shown that he recognized the paper as his trill shortly 
before· hi's death.· Str·a,uss v. Schmidt, 3 Phill. 209, citPd 
in Likefield supra. "· 
In re : Tilden, 18. Jurist, 136 the language of the "·ill 
w:as: . "If it pleas.e Almighty God to call 1ne suddenly 
from this mortal life, and during n1y absence fron1 hoBH\ 
I leave, etc." It was sustained although the testator died 
at home. 
In the Likefield case, the court was influenc~d hy 
testator's having done the very thing as did Ben l~llPr­
beck, viz: having his attention directed to the docuntent 
after it had been written and preserving it. ~I.,hi:' i~ 
evident from the following language: 
"It is shown in this case that the tP~tator 
carefully preserved the paper in conte~t, that he 
examined it the year prior to his death; and 1rhill' 
. these_ facts can not constitute a statutory rl'JHtbli-
cation of it, yet they 1.llustrnte tlze iull'ntiou of 
the maker of the instr1nnent, as they tend to show 
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that he belie-ved he ha~ disposed of hi.s property 
b.Y i_t." (Italics ~d.d.~d) · . · 
''T e think the language used by the testator in 
Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 8 Ann. Cas. 1146, is wuch 
I I • \ : ' 
more deserving of being constru,ed as a co.nditional will 
th~¥· is that in the i~stant c~s~. · ·He~e to9 the ~ourt con-
sidereq t:b.e fact that t~e will w~s- not destr?.Y;ed ·when 
directed to the attention of the testator but ·his oral 
&.-x:pression in reaffirming some constituted republication 
although not in co.nformity witlllegal req-qir.~~~n~~· The 
testator said: · · 
"I intend starting tomorrow mornjng to ¥on-
tana to see my brot:Q.er. Knowing the uncertainty 
and risk of a jR-qrney, Know All ·_persons that I 
do hereby will an~ b~qu~ath my reai and person'al 
property to my wife. XIDCX And should anything 
befall me while away as that I should die, then 
~n that event ,all :rpy ~~tate is conveye~ an.d ·set 
over to my wife." · . ·.~-· · 
w 
Held not merely contingent upon testator's de.atl). on 
. . , I ·,#· :.. •' 
his journey b;t;tt continu~d o;per~tive ~ft.er his safe r~~-g~p 
and his death thereafter. 
The facts of that case a.re much like those of the 
instant case. The will when made was committed to the 
" • J ' • • ~ '· , • 
keeping of testator's wife while dn the j'ourney to Mon-
tana. On testator's return he made inql:d~.Y· of his _w_i~e 
for the will, read it to her ~nd then .:placed it in his 9ff~~e 
safe. 
In Redhea.d v. R~dhead, 83 1\fiss. 141, the ·will read: 
"Realizing the uncertainty of-life at all times 
and the dangers incident to tr~yel, I lea_,ve this ~s 
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.-·, , n-:-. -.a memorandum· of my wishes, should a.uythi·ng 
· ' ~: happ~n tQ me during my intended trip to Bu.ffaJo 
, .. ~ ':·~ T and other pla~e$.~~ ~.tc. (Italics added) 
. ·. ~ e .. 
,"i· '·~ 1 ' 
: }; ' 
"It cannof be overlooked that in eyery w'ill 
that ·ever· was ·w-ritten, or ever will be w~itten 
there is , an occasion for making the will. It i; 
always. present and without it no will would ever 
be made." . 
·;.HU" ,·;~e;;ta~or too¥. his trip and returned home and lived 
some six IT1onths ~hereafter. The will was adtnitted. The 
court said: 
'!'n,.>~u. 
_ :·~ii>!: i,· ;: : "The dapgers incident to his journey togeth('r 
with.the uncertainties of life were the occasion of 
.. :.·r:::, 
his execution of t~e instrument, and its validity 
was riot cbntingent upon his death abroad.'' 
' ~ ·~ 
~. So too in the Ellerbeck will is it evident that Eller-
beck.was .Prompted to make a will because he \Ya~ in the 
hospit~l an<j because of the uncertainties of life. 'rhey 
were clearly the occasion of his writing the docun1rnt. It 
is our position that had Ellerbeck written the doctunrnt 
just prior to his going to the hospital and Haid he wn~ 
about to go to the hospital and should I not survive, tlwn 
a str0nger~case would have been 1nade by contPHtant, hut 
here is a case where Ellerbeck had been in the hospital 
for six day's~ He was getting better and about to lravP 
the hospital, he left the hospital t\vo days after "·riting-
the will. There is nothing in the evidence indicating nny 
etnergency ~r alarn1 - nothing more than a statPtnrnt 
of where Eller heck \vas at the time of thP ,,·ri tin g-. 'l'hr 
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7 
fact that he said "in the event I do not survive" is nothing 
lllOfe than t}}e great lnajority of SUCh documents recite 
'~lTpon n1y death." The 'vords used by Ellerbeck meant 
nothing n1ore than had he said "upon my death" and to 
give them any other meaning is reading something into 
the 'vords clearly not intended by the testator. To give 
the \\'"Ords the meaning which the Court would do requires 
the addition thereto of the words "but die in the hospital" 
or 'die of digestive and other troubles." 
The court appears to be influenced in its decisions 
by the Walker v. Hibbard case. We will 'hereinafter 
point out wherein that case can be distinguished from the 
instant case. However, before doing so we call the atten-
tion of the court to the fact that even in Will cases, courts 
have repeatedly gone very far in placing such construc-
tion on testamentary documents as will entitle them to be 
admitted to probate. This is especially true in those 
cases where it ap-pears most unjust and inequitable to 
hold otherwise. This is particularly noticeable in those 
cases where the recipient is the widow as against others~ 
In the instant case the court has ·gone directly 
against that well established principal of law requiring 
the construction to be placed on the words in fav:or of 
the will. This court has shown that "it is impressed with 
the fact that testator most likely did intend- that Mrs. 
flaws take under Ellerbeck's will as &xpressed in the· 
following language: 
"Were we at liberty to guess what the inten-· 
tion of the testator was at the time of death, we· 
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likely would conclude that he desired to giYe his 
property to Mrs. Haws .. " 
Courts have in not such favorable cases as this one, 
c~nsidered it unnecessary to guess at what the intention 
of the testator was, they have placed such consfruction 
on the. words as to give then1 the 1neaning intended by 
the· writer. 
Let us analyze this case from a logical and reason-
able point of view. Let us put ourselves in the place of 
the testator. This we have a right to do in order to deter-
mine the int_ent of the testator. In so doing we can find 
no reason by word or action which could lead one to 
beli~ve that Ellerbee!< intended that his will should take 
effect only upon his death in the hospital, or fron1 the 
very illnes~, 'Yhich put him there, as the court has con-
strued. Ellerbeck was not certain as to what his illness 
really was as . expressed in his own words. Therefore 
because of this uncertainty he could not have 1nade tlw 
w,ill conditioned on his dying fro1n an ailnlPnt which 
hospitalized hi1n and nothing other than that for he ~aid 
he was hospitalized_ because of digestive and othrr 
·troubles. This court has refused to give consideration to 
the words "and other troubles" but it places a li1nitation 
on the wo;rd.s used. 
Why would Ellerbeck have intended that the will 
take effect only,.as this Court has constrnPd 1 The record 
shows his desire that his relative who had ~ho,rn nn 
interest in hi1n should have, not all of hi~ property, hut 
his interest in his father's estate. lt is <'Vich~nt thr only 
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natural heir of 1fr. Ellerbeck "'as his brother whom he 
had not seen nor heard fron1 ·for many years. The cases 
hold that the intent of the testator comes not from a 
dictionary n1eaning of the words used py the, testa tor 
but fron1 all of the facts and circun1stances and the con-
ditions existing at the time the· will is made. To hold _as 
the Court has done in reversing the trial court, all of 
the circumstances and conditions inducing ~1r. Ellerbeck 
to make his will must be disregarded, this,· including 
testator's actions a few days after its execution and 
after having returned from the hospital, in placing· the 
writing in the cupboard at his home and·. advising Mrs. 
Haws where it could be found. 
From a readin_g of a great many cases involving the 
question here concerned, it seems the courts have decided 
them both in favor of the will and against its admission 
where language very similar has been used, but the deci-
sion has been made upon a consideration Of the circum-
stances surrounding the making of the will and the rela-
tionship of the recipient to the testator, whether it would 
be reasonable for the court to construe the intent the one 
\Vay or the other. We believe this statement is born otit 
hy the decision in the Walker vs. Hibbard case. Ther~ is 
- ., . . . 
a case in which it would seem to. have been.most.unfair 
' - - .· ~ 
and unjust for the court to have decided otherwise than 
as it did decide. There is a man who was practically a 
stranger to testator as compared with her -family wh0m 
she had expressed love for, especially as- to ·one, was the 
recipient under the will. Gomersall had contributed to 
the \V<'akenesses and bad habits of testatri~· as against 
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her family who did everything possible to correct these 
habits. Mrs. Long, testatrix had n1ade the \Yriting, not 
at the hospital .but .prior to entering the hospital. The 
writing was not a devise of property but nothing n1ore 
than an instruction to her Aunt l\Iintie to see that certain 
things were done.· Three days after testatrix left the 
hospital she handed the writing to Gomersall. Go1nersall, 
not testatrix thereafter kept the document in his po~~l)~­
sion at all times. until after the death of testatrix 'vhen 
he produced the document for probate. There testatri\~ 
had no opportunity to destroy the document. Neither is 
it evident. that she did anything by word or deed which 
would indicate her int.ention to republish the will or to 
ratify and confirm that which she had done, or to pro-
nounce it again as her will. These facts are most iinpor-
tant in considering the intent of testator. None of thC'se 
facts are present in the instant case but all evidence' is 
to the contrary. 
In addition to Mrs. Long having written the docu-
ment prior to her entering the hospital to undergo nn 
operation, it is clearly evident that she 1nakes earh 
expression conditioned upon the other. This is evidPllt 
by taking the writing sentence by sentence as follo\v~: 
"On Sunday evening I go to St. Elizabeth's 
. Hospital to have a sl.ight operation." 
In the above words it is evident that l\1 r~. Long-, 
being mindful of the fact that the act of an opPrntion 
might prove to be fatal, she desires to act hecnn~P of thi~ 
situation with which she iR confrontPd. N' ot ~o in tlw 
Eller beck caRP. 
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Then Mrs. Long,. expressing the condition. on. which 
the 'vritings is made says: 
'·I do not anticipate any trouble, but one 
never knows." 
Here again the. ti~e and condition w4ich; Mrs .. Long. 
is about to face is definitely and clearly brought out. 
As a further condition she says: 
"If anything should happen to me.", 
If anything should happen to me frolfl what~ F·rom 
the operation of course, the intent is practically as 
clearly expressed as if it were to contain the addition.a~ 
words, "from the operation." "--,.. j 
The Appellate Court in its co1nparison of the lan-
guage used by Mrs. Long in the Walker case with that·of 
Mr. Ellerbeck in the instant case makes a substitution of 
those words used by 1\Ir. Eller beck, viz: "in the event I 
do not survive" for the words used, ''if anything should 
happen to me" and states "If she had said in the letter~ 
'I only intend this disposition of my estate to be effective 
in the event I do not survive the operation· I am abo:ut 
to submit to', it would not manifest her purp·ose in writ-
ing it more clearly than the words.she employed." In 
this we are in agreement. However, iri the above we have 
a definite condition other and diffe-rent than· &-rists in 
the instant ·case. In the above example this court. s·ays: · 
4
'I only intend this disposition· of my estate. 
to be effective in· the event I do ·not survive the 
O]Jfrat·ion I run abont to subrnit to." (Our italics) 
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The above is a very good example of that ""'hich "·e 
attempt' to point out in the co1nparison of the cases and 
the basis of our- argument that even in the instant cn~P 
had the Ellerheck will been written prior to his going to 
the hospital and· not after he had recovered to such 
extent that he left the hospital two days after haYing 
·written the will, then appellant would have had a 1nueh 
stronger case. In the above example it is clearly evident 
that the intent was conditional, this because Mrs. Long 
was about- to undergo an operation which might prove 
fatal. 
It further appears from a reading of cases, that a 
distinction has been made even when precisely the sa1ne 
words are used under different circumstances, the ques-
tion of intent is the controlling factor. 
This court states that some of our argument a1nount~ 
to a splitting of hairs. Numerous authority support oul' 
position that words can apply to portions of a \rriting 
and not ·to the whole of it, including the 11/assie ea!'\P 
cited in .the Walker v. Hibbard case. vVe say \vithout 
intendipg to be repetitious and where the court conrludP~ 
that the. first sentence makes the will conditional that it 
is clearly evident the intent if i r ean be construed at all 
as conditional was to have Mr.~. -1 fa\vs take total char~P 
of the .home and such little busiuess as 1nay &xi~t. Not 
to the bequest to ~f rs. Haws. ~Ut·h is the only reasonahl(l 
construction which can be pla~ed upon the \rord~ fron1 a 
consideration of all of the circu1nstanres and <·onditinn~ 
attendant upon testator at the tinlP h~ n1nd(l thP \viii. 
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,-v e think the Bradford v. Bradford case which is 
cited in the TT' alker v. Hibbard case is much more appli-
cable than th-e TValkcr rase. In the Bradford case the 
testator used the words "about to start upon a long 
j.ourney, I deem it prudent to· provide for the disposi-
tion of my property, in case I should not return." The 
court holding that the words did not constitute a condi-
tion upon \vhich the will is dependent said: 
"In connection with the other words quoted, 
they simply set forth the circumstances which 
induced him to make his will before his departure, 
for fear he might never return." 
This same reasoning can be well adapt-ed to the 
instant case. The court further said in the Bra.dford 
case: 
"The supposed condition is alone connected 
with the motive and reasons for the. prudence he 
deemed it his duty to exercise, and it is evident he 
did not intend to say 'In the event I do not return, 
then I make the following disposition of my prop-
erty, or wish it disposed of in a particular mode,' 
but that he had doubts of his return, which arose 
fron1 his physical condition, the long journey he 
was about to tal\:e, and the cas11alties which so 
often_ occur to travelers, and for these reasons he 
absolutely disposed of the 'vhole of his· estate 
\vithout any conditions 'vhatever.'' 
The court refuses to give any consideration whatso-
ever to the act of Eller beck in his ·placing the document in 
thP cupboard advising Mrs. Haws where she might find 
satnP, upon the will being directed to his attention after 
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he _ return,ed from the hospital and states that "neither 
his parol declaration as to what he would do 'Yith it nor 
his placing it in the cupboard would fulfill the statutory 
requirements for executing a will. If what he did "·a~ 
intended as an attempted revival or republication, it "·as 
ineffective for 1 such purpose." This reasoning is con-
trary·· to other well considered cases several of 'vhich are 
hereinabove cited, and in which while the courts have 
recognized that the act of testator did not comply 'vith 
statutory requirements, still it most strongly showed the 
intent ~f the testator and had the effect of announcing 
again and under changed conditions that \vhich i~ con-
tained in the writing. 
We have felt and still feel the act and deed of Eller-
beck after returning to his home from the hospital i~ 
practically as conclusive of our position in contending-
that Ellerbeck's intention was to not make a conditional 
will as had he re-written the document at that ti1ne. \Yhy 
would Ellerbeck have preserved the will when it had bePn 
directed to his attention and directed Mr. Ha,vs' atten-
tion to the place "vhere it could be found, had he intPndP<l 
the will to be conditional~ There is just no an~\\'Pr to 
such question. For the court to maintain its position thnt 
a statutory republication of the will was nerrssary i~ 
e;r.fro:ne·o·us. ~We cannot presume for the purpose that 
Ellerbeck was informed on the law of republication~ of 
wills. Ellerbeck in this case considered the doruJnflnt to 
be his will and expected and desired l\1 rs. I Ia,vs to take 
under it. Ellerbeck believed he had dispoi-i<·d of hi~ prop-
erty by it. 
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In Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. 331, 8 ,Ann. Cas. 
1148; 
Strauss v. Schmidt, 3 Phill. 209; 
Likefield r. Likefield, 82 l(y. 589. 
In each of the above cited cases the court was influence·d 
by the fact that testator had- an opportunity to destroy 
the writing at a later date, and having his attention 
directed to the writing, by his act and deed constituted 
a reaffirming of the writing and a republication al~ 
though not in conformity with legal requirements. · 
If precedent is against justice, then a bold stroke for 
right must, as has been frequently done, in our_ federa1 
supreme court many times in the past few years, be 
made. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, petitioner prays that a rehearing and 
re-argument be granted, that the judgment of the trial 
court be sustained and that the opinion and judgment 
of this court be vacated and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
Attorneys for Petit.ioner. 
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